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L. J. Anderson
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

DUBLIN DIVISION

JOSE CAMPOS,)
Petitioner,)
v.) CV 308-058
WALT WELLS, Warden,)
Respondent.)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, an inmate currently incarcerated at McRae Correctional Facility in McRae, Georgia, has filed an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contesting the execution of his sentence of confinement.¹ Petitioner argues, relying upon White v. Scibana, 314 F. Supp.2d 834, 838 (W.D. Wis. 2004), that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly calculated his good conduct time (“GCT”) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), thereby depriving him of the possibility to earn a maximum of fifty-four (54) days of GCT for each of the years he has been sentenced to serve. For the following reasons, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** that the petition be **DENIED** and that this civil action be **CLOSED**.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a federal prisoner convicted of a drug offense. (Doc. no. 1, p. 2). He was sentenced to a term of 210 months of imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised

¹Upon prompting from the Court, Petitioner paid the filing fee.

release. (*Id.* at 12). The basis for Petitioner's § 2241 petition is his contention § 3624(b)(1) requires that his GCT be calculated based on the time he has been sentenced to serve rather than - as the BOP calculates GCT - based on the time he actually serves.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624, a federal prisoner can receive credit for "satisfactory behavior" as follows:

(b) Credit toward service of sentence for satisfactory behavior....

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. . . . [C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). The BOP has promulgated a regulation concerning the proper method for calculating GCT time under this statute which provides that an inmate may earn GCT credits based on the time actually served and not the sentence imposed. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20.

II. ANALYSIS

First, the district court decision from Wisconsin upon which Petitioner bases his argument has been overturned and is no longer good law. See White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, White v. Hobart, 545 U.S. 1116 (2005). More importantly, the Eleventh Circuit has decided that although the statutory language of § 3624(b)(1) is ambiguous, "the BOP's interpretation of the statute that a federal prisoner

should get good time credit of 54 days for each year he actually serves in prison is reasonable and therefore is due to be affirmed.”² Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005) (*per curiam*). In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit followed the decisions of five other circuits that reached the same conclusion.³ *Id.* (citing Perez-Olivio v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005); O'Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005) (*per curiam*); Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 534 (4th Cir. 2005); White, 390 F.3d at 1002-03; Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, Petitioner is clearly not entitled to the relief he seeks in the form of the recalculation of his GCT.^{4,5}

²The Eleventh Circuit also decided that the rule of lenity is inapplicable because the BOP’s interpretation is reasonable. Brown, 416 F.3d at 1273.

³At the time these cases were decided, a different version of 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 was in effect; the current version became effective on December 5, 2005. However, the distinctions between the previous and current version do not affect the analysis determining that it is appropriate for the BOP to calculate GCT based on the time served rather than the sentence imposed.

⁴An order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted need not be issued whenever “it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. As Petitioner is plainly not entitled to the relief he seeks, the Court now makes its recommendation without first directing Respondent to respond to the petition.

⁵Even if the Eleventh Circuit had not already rejected Petitioner’s argument, Petitioner would face another obstacle. Prisoners seeking habeas relief, including relief pursuant to § 2241, are subject to administrative exhaustion requirements. Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (*per curiam*), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1036 (2004); Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting requirement for exhausting administrative remedies with the BOP prior to seeking § 2241 relief in federal court); see also Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (*per curiam*) (noting exhaustion requirement in relation to bringing § 2241 petition); United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting applicability of exhaustion requirement to claims for computation of sentence credit awards). Here, Petitioner candidly admits that

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** that the petition be **DENIED** and that this civil action be **CLOSED**.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August, 2008, at Augusta, Georgia.


W. LEON BARFIELD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

he did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his § 2241 petition. (Doc. no. 1, p. 4). Thus, even if the Court were not recommending that the petition be denied on the merits, the petition would be due to be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.